Didn't they more or less break the Apple price-fixing attempt? Interesting interpretation.
I don't think Amazon had anything to do with the original case, but I don't have easy access to the court documents. Looks to be this case:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Apple_Inc.
After reading that article, I'm still not sure what's going on or what, specifically, is being alleged.
It doesn't even say who the litigants are aside from "other publishing companies." Does that mean Barnes & Noble, Kobo, Apple, etc. are teaming up against Amazon and the Big 5? That's the only conclusion I can draw here.
You get more detail if you read the linked court document. (
https://www.hbsslaw.com/sites/default/files/case-downloads/amazon-ebooks-price-fixing/01.14.21-complaint.pdf )
Plaintiffs:
"SHANNON FREMGEN, MARY CHRISTOPHERSON-JUVE, DENISE DELEON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, "
"Plaintiffs are consumers and direct purchaser plaintiffs from several states who frequently shop for electronic books (“eBooks”) published by the Big Five"
The main allegations in my opinion:
(pg 46)
79. As the largest print and eBook retailer, Amazon’s bargaining power with the Big Five is immense. It could have retained its right to discount their eBooks, but it agreed to let them set their own inflated prices in exchange for high commissions and the Big Five’s guarantee that no other eBook retailer could offer their eBooks at a lower price or better terms.
80. According to the House Judiciary Committee, Amazon has always employed MFNs or their equivalents in its contracts with trade publishers.149 The EU Commission makes clear that even when the Big Five were prohibited from having MFNs in their eBook contracts, they and Amazon got around that restriction by employing notification provisions that had precisely the same effect.
81. Whether using MFN clauses (business model parity, agency price parity, agency commission parity, price promotion parity, selection parity, or discount pool provisions) or notice provisions, the objective is always the same: to prevent “publishers from partnering with any of Amazon’s competitors” and to reinforce “Amazon’s ‘stranglehold’ and ‘control’ over book distribution.” Through these restraints, Amazon has acquired and maintained its monopoly power. Competitors lack any incentive to offer promotional advantages or alternative business models, like eBook rentals, to gain a following because Amazon demands that the Big Five offer that same option on Amazon.com. This results in fewer innovative products or business models and higher prices for eBooks consumers.
(pg 52)
111. The Big Five Co-conspirators employ an agency model to sell their eBooks. Under the agency model, the publishers set the price, and retailers—acting as agents for the publisher—take a commission on the sale to readers. The agency model does not permit the retailer-agent to discount the price unilaterally, e.g., to offer books at a two-for-one price or lower the price of a book through any membership or loyalty program.
112. Plaintiffs overpay when they buy the Big Five’s eBooks directly from the Big Five Co-conspirators on the Co-conspirator’s own website or through a retail eBook platform that competes with Amazon. As required by the MFN, when Amazon’s Co-conspirators sell their eBooks through an agency model (or also in the case of Co-conspirator HarperCollins through its own website), they sell at a retail price that is equal to or higher than the price they sell their eBooks on Amazon.com. It is in the Big Five Co-conspirators’ economic self-interest to expand their share of the retail sales of their eBooks and diversify their distribution. It would serve this interest to allow Amazon’s retail rivals to develop alternative business models that cost less to consumers but increase the Big Five’s revenue. Offering Amazon’s retail rivals special edition or enhanced eBooks would also attract new customers, increase sales, and reduce the Big Five’s dependency on Amazon. Similarly, avoiding the commissions charged by Amazon and selling through their own websites at a greater discount or allowing Amazon’s retail rivals to add their own discounts and promotions to steer more sales to their platforms would also serve the Big Five’s economic self-interest. But Amazon and its Co-conspirators agree not to do this, so as to preserve the supracompetitive prices of the Big Five’s eBooks. Plaintiffs and class members who purchase directly from Amazon’s Co-conspirators through Amazon’s retail rivals are harmed because they pay prices fixed by Amazon and its Co-conspirators and without the benefit of discounts, promotions, and potentially lower-cost alternative business models that would exist in a competitive market, where these agreed restraints did not exist.
There's also some pretty graphs that show a correlation between deals with Amazon and ebook price hikes
How does the outcome affect indies?
Probably not at all, this class action is for readers of books published by the Big 5.
EDIT: actually, who knows really what the outcome will be. If some terms can't be in the contracts the Big 5 have, that may affect terms Amazon can offer to indies as well, such as Kindle Select. Regardless, we'll have to wait to see a ruling before we see any change.